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Reconsolidation of episodic memories: A subtle
reminder triggers integration of new information
Almut Hupbach,1,3 Rebecca Gomez,1 Oliver Hardt,2 and Lynn Nadel1
1Department of Psychology, The University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA; 2Department of Psychology, McGill
University, Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T5, Canada
Recent demonstrations of “reconsolidation” suggest that memories can be modified when they are reactivated.
Reconsolidation has been observed in human procedural memory and in implicit memory in infants. This study asks
whether episodic memory undergoes reconsolidation. College students learned a list of objects on Day 1. On Day 2,
they received a reminder or not, and then learned a second list. Memory for List 1 was tested immediately on Day 2
(Experiment 2) or on Day 3 (Experiment 1). Although the reminder did not moderate the number of items recalled
from List 1 on either day, subjects who received a reminder incorrectly intermixed items from the second list when
recalling List 1 on Day 3. Experiment 2 showed that this effect does not occur immediately and thus is
time-dependent. The reminder did not affect memory for List 2 on Day 3 (Experiment 3), demonstrating that
modification occurred only for the original memory (List 1). The study demonstrates the crucial role of reminders
for the modification of episodic memory, that reconsolidation of episodic memory is time-dependent, and, in
contrast to previous reconsolidation findings, that reconsolidation is also a constructive process, one that supports
the incorporation of new information in memory.
Consolidation theory assumes that memories are labile during a
limited window after encoding, but as time passes, memories are
consolidated and become resistant to change (e.g., McGaugh
2000). The rediscovery of reactivation-induced reconsolidation
has challenged this view (cf. Przybyslawski and Sara 1997; Sara
2000; Nader 2003; cf. Lewis et al. 1968; Misanin et al. 1968, for
early demonstrations of the reconsolidation phenomenon). In
contrast to the consolidation account, reactivation is thought to
return memories to a labile state, which allows them to change.
In the normal course of events, reactivated memories are retained
through a process similar to initial consolidation, i.e., reconsoli-
dation. This view of memory formation as a dynamic process
rather than a static one has implications for theories of memory
and for our understanding of memory change.
Nader et al. (2000) showed that memories are labile by dem-
onstrating that fear memory in the rat can be severely impaired
at the time the memory is recalled. Rats received several tone-
footshock pairings on Day 1. The following day, half of the ani-
mals were again exposed to the tone. The tone elicited freezing,
indicating that the rats recalled the conditioned fear memory. All
rats were then injected with a protein-synthesis inhibitor or its
vehicle into the amygdala. When tested for fear memory in re-
sponse to the tone on Day 3, rats who had received the remind-
ing tone before injection of the inhibitor showed less freezing
than the vehicle-injected rats and, most importantly, than rats
who were not reminded. This demonstrated that reactivation of
the fear memory returned the memory to a labile state, which
like a newly acquired, nonconsolidated memory requires de novo
protein-synthesis in order to be maintained. The protein-
synthesis inhibitor blocked reconsolidation, and thus led to
memory impairment. This finding has now been replicated in a
variety of species and paradigms (see Dudai and Eisenberg 2004;
Alberini 2005).
Walker et al. (2003) recently demonstrated reconsolidation
effects in humans. Participants were trained on a procedural mo-
tor-skill task that involved finger-tapping a simple sequence (e.g.,
4-1-3-2). Twenty-four hours later they briefly rehearsed the se-
quence (reactivating it) and learned a second sequence (e.g., 2-3-
1-4). When tested on Day 3, accuracy performance for Sequence
1 was significantly impaired in comparison to a group of partici-
pants who did not rehearse Sequence 1 before learning Sequence
2. This shows that the reactivation of the memory for Sequence
1 on Day 2 destabilized it such that a competing motor pattern
could interfere.
Galluccio (2005) and Galluccio and Rovee-Collier (2005) in-
vestigated the fate of reactivated memories in infants trained to
kick their foot to activate a mobile. After a delay, infants were
reminded of the event: The moving mobile was presented for a
brief period during which it was no longer attached to the baby’s
foot. After reactivation, one group of infants learned to move a
novel mobile. One day later, infants who were exposed to the
novel mobile showed a modification of the reactivated memory
in that they no longer recognized the original mobile and solely
reacted to the novel one.
Thus, reconsolidation effects have been shown in humans,
but only for procedural memory (Walker et al. 2003) and condi-
tioning (Galluccio 2005). These are both forms of implicit
memory that do not require conscious recollection, making it
important to ask whether reconsolidation also applies to explicit
memory, a form of memory that allows for the conscious recol-
lection of events (episodic memory) and facts (semantic
memory).
Although the idea of fixed consolidated memory traces has
been the dominant view in neurobiology, it has long been
known in cognitive psychology that episodic memories can be
reconstructed. For instance, Bartlett’s (1932) classic study in
which participants were repeatedly asked to recall a Native
American folktale showed that, over time, participants recon-
structed their recall to better fit their own cultural schema. It is
also well known, from the study of retroactive interference, that
a subsequent learning experience can impair performance for
previously acquired material (e.g., Barnes and Underwood 1959;
Delprato 2005). And we know that episodic memories can be
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altered by post-event information. For instance, providing par-
ticipants with misleading information after the encoding of an
event can revise the original memory (misinformation effect;
e.g., Loftus 2005). In contrast to those previous studies, the de-
sign and hypotheses of our study were directly derived from re-
cent studies in neurobiology. Based on the reconsolidation find-
ings we hypothesized that the modification of consolidated epi-
sodic memories critically depends upon their reactivation. In this
way, our study tries to bridge the gap between recent studies in
neurobiology and a long-standing tradition in cognitive psychol-
ogy. We will consider the similarities and differences between
previous cognitive studies and our findings in more detail in the
General Discussion.
In our study, college students were taught a list of items on
Day 1. After a reminder (or no reminder) on Day 2, they were
taught a second list of items. Memory performance for the origi-
nal list was tested on Day 3. If reminding puts the memory of List
1 (Table 1) into a labile state, then immediate learning of List 2
(Table 1) should alter memory for List 1. It is important to note
that the reconsolidation account makes no predictions about the
direction of influence. It simply states that reactivation reopens
memories for possible modification. The direction of influence is
determined by the post-reminder manipulation. Thus, memories
could be strengthened, weakened, or new information could be
incorporated. The latter effect would reflect a constructive rather
than destructive effect of reconsolidation.
We reactivated memory in a more subtle way than in the
Walker et al. (2003) and Galluccio (Galluccio 2005; Galluccio and
Rovee-Collier 2005) studies. In the latter cases, participants were
re-presented with the actual learned material. We asked partici-
pants to describe the learning procedure without asking them to
explicitly recall the learned items in order to test whether an
incidental reminder can reactivate memory.
Materials and Methods
Experiment 1
Design and participants
The only independent variable that was varied between subjects
was the procedure on Day 2: Before learning the second list,
subjects were either reminded or not reminded of the learning
session that had taken place on Day 1 (reminder and no-
reminder group, respectively), and a third group of subjects omit-
ted Day 2 altogether (interference control). This group was in-
cluded as a comparison to the experimental groups to ascertain
the possible interfering effect of List 2 on memory for List 1
regardless of a reminder.
A total of 36 undergraduate students from the University of
Arizona participated in the experiment. They received course
credit for participation. Twelve subjects were randomly assigned
to each condition.
Materials
List 1 and List 2 materials each consisted of 20 unrelated objects
(see Table 1).
Procedure
The three sessions took place on Monday, Wednesday, and Fri-
day of the same week. Participants were informed that they
would have to memorize different lists of objects on the different
days. Students participated one at a time.
On Day 1, the experimenter pulled out one item at a time
from a bag and placed it in a distinctive blue basket (objects were
from List 1). Participants were asked to name each item and to
pay close attention so they could remember the items later. After
all 20 items were placed into the basket the experimenter hid the
basket and asked the participants to remember as many items as
possible. This procedure was repeated until the participants re-
membered at least 17 of the 20 objects or until a maximum of
four learning trials was reached.
The procedure on Day 2 differed for the three experimental
groups. For participants in the reminder group, the same experi-
menter who administered the procedure on Day 1 showed them
the empty blue basket and asked, “Do you remember this basket
and what we did with it?” Participants were encouraged to de-
scribe the procedure, but were stopped if they started to recall
any specific items. For participants in the no-reminder group a
new experimenter administered the experimental procedure in a
different room. The experimenter did not ask what had hap-
pened on Day 1 nor did she present the basket. The interference
control participants omitted Day 2.
Participants in both the reminder and the no-reminder
groups were asked to learn a second list of 20 objects (List 2). The
procedure differed from that of Day 1 so the task would not serve
as a reminder. All objects were placed in front of the participants,
who were asked to name each of the objects, and were given 30
sec to study them. The experimenter then removed the objects
and asked the participants to recall as many of the objects as
possible. If participants recalled <17 objects, the objects were
placed in front of the participant for another 30 sec. This was
repeated until participants recalled at least 17 objects, or for a
maximum of four learning trials.
On Day 3, the experimenter from Day 1 asked the partici-
pants to recall as many objects as possible from Day 1, and the
experimenter noted the remembered objects. When participants
indicated that they could not remember any more items, the
experimenter engaged the participants in a conversation about
an unrelated topic for about 30 sec. The experimenter repeated
the recall test by asking the participants to recall the objects
again. This procedure was repeated for a total of four consecutive
recall trials in order to test reliability of recall. The recall session
took ∼15 min to complete.
Results
Performance on Day 1: Acquisition of List 1
We recorded how many learning trials were necessary for partici-
pants to recall at least 17 objects. Participants who recalled <17
objects during the fourth learning trial were given a score of 5.
Participants took on average 3.11 (SD = 1.26) learning trials to
Table 1. Lists of objects presented on Day 1 and Day 2
List 1 List 2
Balloon Apple
Bow Band-aid
Calculator Battery
Toy car Book
Crayon Cassette tape
Cup Cellular phone
Dice Comb
Feather Dollar bill
Flashlight Elephant
Flower Envelope
Glue Paper clip
Key Toy pot
Sock Puzzle piece
Sponge Rock
Spoon Straw
Sunglasses Thread
Teabag Tissue
Tennis ball Watch
Toothbrush Shovel
Whistle Zipper
Hupbach et al.
48 Learning & Memory
www.learnmem.org
reach criterion. There were no differences between the three
groups (F(2,33) = 2.40, MSE = 1.47, P = 0.11).
Performance on Day 2: Acquisition of List 2
Participants took on average 3.79 (SD = 1.38) learning trials to
reach criterion. There was no difference between the reminder
and the no-reminder group (t < 1).
Performance on Day 3: Recall
The mean percent of items recalled from List 1 (averaged over all
four recall trials) and the mean percent of items falsely recalled
from List 2 (intrusions, averaged over all four recall trials) are
displayed in Figure 1. Although analyses were conducted on
number of items, we report mean percentages in figures to facili-
tate cross-experiment comparisons.
List 1 recall
The number of objects recalled from List 1 was analyzed with a
3  4 mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with group (re-
minder, no-reminder, interference control) as the between-
subjects variable and trial (1-4) as the within-subjects variable.
Because the sphericity assumption was violated, we report
Huynh-Feldt corrected values. The ANOVA revealed a main effect
of trial (F(2.48,81.75) = 11.12, MSE = 1.78, P < 0.01; all other effects,
F  1.74, P  0.19). Within-subjects contrasts revealed a linear
trend such that recall performance increased across trials, repli-
cating previous studies (cf. Howe and Brainerd 1989)
(F(1,33) = 18.01, MSE = 2.47, P < 0.01, all other trends, F  2.85,
P  0.10).
Intrusions from List 2
The number of intrusions from List 2 was analyzed with a 3
(group)  4 (trial) mixed ANOVA. We found only a main effect
of group (F(2,33) = 21.84, MSE = 13.39, P < 0.01; all other effects,
F  1.43, P  0.25). Post hoc comparisons (Dunnett’s C) revealed
that participants in the reminder group showed significantly
more intrusions of items from List 2 in their recall of List 1 than
participants in the no-reminder group or participants in the in-
terference control. There was no significant difference in the
amount of intrusions between the no-reminder group and the
interference control.
Because the no-reminder group showed few intrusions (floor
effects), and the variance was higher in the reminder than in the
no-reminder group, we ran an additional nonparametric test
with the mean number of intrusions recalled by each participant
over the four test trials serving as the dependent variable. A
Mann-Whitney U-test detected significant differences between
the reminder and the no-reminder group (U = 20.00, P < 0.01).
Discussion
The experimental groups did not differ in the number of objects
recalled from List 1 on Day 3, showing that the reminder did not
strengthen or weaken memory of the original list, and that learn-
ing a second list had no lasting impact on memory for items on
List 1.4 However, the reminder did reactivate memory of the
original list, returning it to a state in which new information
could be incorporated: When asked to recall List 1 on Day 3,
participants in the reminder group incorrectly intermixed a high
number of objects from List 2 in their recall of List 1. In contrast,
participants in the no-reminder group showed few intrusions.
Our results parallel Walker et al.’s (2003) findings on recon-
solidation in human procedural memory and suggest that ex-
plicit memory processes are subject to the same updating process.
Nader et al. (2005) propose a reconsolidation process involving
three steps: (1) Reactivation of the existing memory returning it
to a labile state, (2) modification of the existing memory, and (3)
reconsolidation of the modified memory over a period of time.
While Experiment 1 clearly demonstrates the first two steps (the
reminder reactivated the memory for the original list, and the
presentation of the new list modified the existing memory), an
open question is whether memory was altered immediately or
whether, as assumed by Nader (2003), memory modification in-
volves a time-dependent reconsolidation process. If so, we
should see no difference between the reminder and the no-
reminder group in a memory test administered immediately after
presentation of the second list on Day 2 (as shown by Walker et
al. 2003). We addressed this issue in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
We tested whether a reminder has an immediate effect on
memory or whether memory modification occurs over time. Par-
ticipants were asked to recall List 1 directly after they had learned
List 2 on Day 2. If the reminder-induced modification effects are
instant, we should replicate the findings of Experiment 1, i.e., we
should see more intrusions in the reminder than in the no-
reminder group. If, as suggested by the reconsolidation account,
reactivated memories need to undergo a time-dependent recon-
solidation process, we might not find any immediate differences
between the reminder and no-reminder group.
Materials and Methods
Experiment 2 employed exactly the same materials and experi-
mental groups, and followed exactly the same procedure as Ex-
periment 1 with one exception: The experiment consisted of
only two experimental sessions (Monday, Wednesday). The pro-
cedure described for Day 3 in Experiment 1 was administered on
Day 2 immediately after the reminder and no-reminder group
had learned List 2.
4One could raise the objection that our failure to find differences in List 1 recall
stemmed from lack of statistical power. However, we recently replicated this
effect in 5- and 9-year-old children. In these age groups, the numerical differ-
ence in the recall of List 1 items between the reminder and the no-reminder
groups was much smaller. Given that all other effects were replicated in the
younger age groups, we are confident that the null effect in Experiment 1 was
not simply due to a lack of statistical power.
Figure 1. Mean percentage of objects correctly and falsely recalled on
Day 3 (Experiment 1) in the reminder, the no-reminder, and the inter-
ference control group during Experiment 1 (recall test on Day 3). Error
bars represent standard errors of means. Note: Participants were asked to
recall objects from List 1. Objects that were falsely recalled from List 2 are
labeled as Intrusions.
Reconsolidation of episodic memories
Learning & Memory 49
www.learnmem.org
Participants
A total of 36 undergraduate students from the University of Ari-
zona who had not taken part in Experiment 1 participated in
Experiment 2. They received course credit for participation.
Twelve subjects were randomly assigned to each of the three
conditions (reminder, no reminder, interference control).
Results
Performance on Day 1: Acquisition of List 1
Participants took on average 3.17 (SD = 1.08) learning trials to
recall at least 17 objects. The three groups did not differ in the
amount of learning trials (F(2,33) = 1.54, MSE = 1.14, P = 0.23).
Performance on Day 2: Acquisition of List 2
Participants in the reminder group (M = 2.50, SD = 0.91) learned
List 2 with fewer trials than participants in the no-reminder
group (M = 4.00, SD = 1.21, t(22) = 3.45, P < 0.01).
Performance on Day 2: Recall
The mean number of items recalled from List 1 and the mean
number of items falsely recalled from List 2 (intrusions) are dis-
played in Figure 2.
List 1 recall
The number of objects recalled from List 1 was analyzed with
a 3 (group)  4 (trial) mixed ANOVA as in Experiment 1.
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group
(F(2,33) = 17.55, MSE = 31.00, P < 0.01). Post hoc comparisons
(Dunnett’s C) showed that the interference control group re-
called significantly more items than the reminder and the no-
reminder groups. The latter two groups did not differ in their
performance. Additionally, the main effect of trial was significant
(F(2.78,91.56) = 14.72, MSE = 1.46, P < 0.01 [Huynh-Feldt corrected
values]). Within-subjects contrasts revealed a linear trend such
that recall performance increased across trials (F(1,33) = 26.23,
MSE = 2.25, P < 0.01; all other trends, F < 1).
Intrusions from List 2
The number of intrusions from List 2 was analyzed with a 3
(group)  4 (trial) mixed ANOVA. None of the effects were sig-
nificant (F  2.37, P  0.11).
Discussion
The reminder clearly had no immediate effect on memory for List
1: When asked to recall List 1 on Day 2, the reminder and the
no-reminder groups did not differ in the number of objects re-
called from List 1 and, more importantly, in both groups, the
number of intrusions from List 2 was very low.
The interference control group that did not learn a second
list at all recalled more objects from List 1 than the reminder and
the no-reminder group. This effect could reflect a general retro-
active interference effect. However, because this effect only oc-
curred when memory for List 1 was tested immediately after
learning List 2 (Experiment 2), and not on a later memory test
(Experiment 1), the effect might be due to a nonspecific effect of
fatigue resulting from learning a second list right before recall of
the first list. A third explanation is that the difference reflects an
extra load on participants who may have been actively suppress-
ing the List 2 items they had just learned during their recall of
List 1. The latter two explanations are consistent with the fact
that the reminder and no-reminder groups recalled fewer items
from List 1 when tested immediately (Experiment 2) than when
tested after a delay (Experiment 1). Alternately, the better recall
after a longer time delay (Experiment 1) could be the result of
spontaneous recovery from retrieval inhibition that was caused
by the preceding learning of List 2 (e.g., Wheeler 1995).
Importantly, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that the
reminder effect found in the first experiment does not occur
immediately (as would be predicted if this were retroactive inter-
ference). Rather, as predicted by a reconsolidation account, the
effect evolves over time.
Experiment 3
One alternative explanation for the reminder effect found in Ex-
periment 1 is that the reminder group had difficulties differenti-
ating between List 1 and 2 because both lists were learned in the
same context. Participants in the reminder group learned List 2
in the same spatial context as List 1. Additionally, the same ex-
perimenter who had instructed them on Day 1 administered the
task on Day 2. In contrast, participants in the no-reminder group
were presented with List 2 in a different room and were in-
structed by a different experimenter. According to a source-
monitoring account (Johnson et al. 1993), the more features
memories for different events have in common, the more likely
source errors are to occur. Thus, the similarity in environmental
context during encoding of List 1 and 2 in the reminder group
could have led to source confusions. However, contextual dis-
tinctiveness does not always help specify the source of a memory.
For example, studies in the misinformation paradigm show that
the similarity of the environmental context in which event and
post-event information is presented has no significant impact on
the misinformation effect (e.g., Bonto and Payne 1991; Mitchell
and Zaragoza 2001), thus similarities in the environmental con-
text of List 1 and List 2 learning may not necessarily explain our
findings.
Nevertheless, if the reminder effect simply reflects source-
monitoring difficulties, participants should just as likely intermix
List 1 items in their recall of List 2 as they intermixed List 2 items
into their recall of List 1 in Experiment 1. This was tested in
Experiment 3. Participants were asked to recall List 2 on Day 3
instead of List 1.
Materials and Methods
Experiment 3 employed exactly the same materials and followed
exactly the same procedure as Experiment 1 with two exceptions:
(1) Participants were asked to recall List 2 instead of List 1 on Day
3, and (2) we did not include a no-interference control group.
Figure 2. Mean percentage of objects correctly and falsely recalled on
Day 2 (Experiment 2) in the reminder, the no-reminder, and the inter-
ference control group. Error bars represent standard errors of means.
Note: Participants were asked to recall objects from List 1. Objects that
were falsely recalled from List 2 are labeled as Intrusions.
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Participants
A total of 24 undergraduate students from the University of Ari-
zona who had not taken part in either of Experiments 1 or 2
participated in Experiment 3. They received course credit or fi-
nancial compensation for their participation. Twelve subjects
were randomly assigned to each condition (reminder, no-
reminder).
Results
Performance on Day 1: Acquisition of List 1
Participants took on average 3.75 (SD = 1.03) learning trials to
recall at least 17 objects. The groups did not differ in the amount
of learning trials (t < 1).
Performance on Day 2: Acquisition of List 2
Participants took on average 3.33 (SD = 1.40) learning trials to
recall at least 17 objects. The groups did not differ in the amount
of learning trials (t < 1).
Performance on Day 3: Recall
The mean number of items recalled from List 2 and the mean
number of items falsely recalled from List 1 (intrusions) are dis-
played in Figure 3.
List 2 recall
The number of objects recalled from List 2 was analyzed with a 2
(group)  4 (trial) mixed ANOVA. The ANOVA revealed only a
significant main effect of trial (F(2.09,45.93) = 8.37, MSE = 1.75,
P < 0.01 [Huynh-Feldt corrected values]; no other effects were
significant [F < 1]). Within-subjects contrasts revealed a linear
trend such that recall performance increased across trials
(F(1,22) = 13.48, MSE = 2.26, P < 0.01; all other trends, F < 1).
Intrusions from List 1
The number of intrusions from List 2 was analyzed with a 2
(group)  4 (trial) mixed ANOVA. None of the effects were sig-
nificant (F  2.13, P  0.16). Additionally, we compared the
number of intrusions for the reminder groups of Experiment 1
and 3 with a 2 (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 3) 4 (trial) mixed
ANOVA. We found a significant main effect of experiment
(F(1,22) = 14.57, MSE = 22.14, P < 0.01), showing that the re-
minder group in Experiment 1 (recall of List 1) showed signifi-
cantly more intrusions than the reminder group in Experiment 3
(recall of List 2).
Discussion
Experiment 3 shows that the reminder had no effect on recall of
List 2. Participants in the reminder group intermixed items from
List 2 into List 1 (Experiment 1), but they showed few intrusions
from List 1 into List 2 recall (Experiment 3). The 5.4% intrusion
rate in Figure 3 represents an average of one item out of a possible
20. If participants had been generally uncertain about the source
(i.e., the list) of the items they recalled, List 1 and 2 should have
been equally affected. Although participants in the reminder
group of Experiment 1 clearly misattributed the source of many
List 2 items as being from List 1, this source error is a rather
unusual one because it is asymmetric and because it contradicts
the assumption that, with time delay, source errors should in-
crease. Because List 1 was learned two days before List 2, partici-
pants should have been more likely to confuse the source of List
1 than List 2 items.
Walker et al. (2003) reported similar findings for the proce-
dural motor-skill task: As in Experiment 3, memory for the sec-
ond sequence was not affected by a brief rehearsal of the first
sequence. However, like Experiment 1, the second sequence
negatively affected memory of the first sequence when the first
was rehearsed prior to learning the second one.
Taken together, Experiments 1 and 3 show that the re-
minder uniquely affected the reactivated memory for List 1 thus
eliminating simple source-monitoring difficulties as an explana-
tion.
General Discussion
The present study demonstrates reconsolidation effects in hu-
man episodic memory. Although many have suggested that
memory storage is dynamic (e.g., Tulving 1984; Loftus 2005),
until recently reactivation as a prerequisite for memory change
was not considered. We show that the modification of episodic
memories depends critically upon their preceding reactivation as
suggested by the reconsolidation account.
Similar to what has been found for Pavlovian conditioning
(e.g., Nader et al. 2000), instrumental conditioning (e.g., Wang et
al. 2005), and human procedural memory (Walker et al. 2003),
reactivated episodic memories also undergo a time-dependent
reconsolidation process: Incorporation of new information did
not occur immediately but was seen two days after memory re-
activation and subsequent presentation of new material.
The finding, that stored memories remain open to change as
a function of related experience, suggests that the paradigmatic
assumption in memory research of a “fixed” trace or “engram” is
in need of modification. We have recently proposed a different
kind of memory model—the “multiple trace theory” (MTT)
(Nadel and Moscovitch 1997; Moscovitch and Nadel 1998; Mos-
covitch et al. 2005), which takes as given that reactivating a pre-
viously “stored” memory leads to the creation of a new version of
that memory. MTT was originally proposed to account for
anomalous results in the study of memory consolidation (e.g., its
long duration), prior to the re-emergence of the reconsolidation
account. However, the characteristics of reconsolidation mesh
well with MTT and provide strong support for this alternative
account to the standard version of memory consolidation.
Although reconsolidation is a rather new concept in neuro-
biology, the idea that episodic memory traces can be modified by
post-event information has long been accepted in cognitive psy-
chology. The most widely studied phenomena illustrating the
reconstructive nature of episodic memory are retroactive inter-
Figure 3. Mean percentage of objects correctly and falsely recalled
from List 2 on Day 3 (Experiment 3) in the reminder and the no-reminder
groups. Error bars represent standard errors of means. Note: Participants
were asked to recall objects from List 2. Objects that were falsely recalled
from List 1 are labeled as Intrusions.
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ference and misinformation. What are the similarities and differ-
ences between those effects and the present reminder effect? The
most obvious similarity is in regard to the effects themselves
where recall of the originally encoded information is affected by
the interpolated presentation of new information. However,
there are also important differences in the paradigms and effects,
which we will now consider.
The classic retroactive interference paradigm involves learn-
ing a list of stimulus pairs (A–B) followed by subsequent learning
of stimulus pairs of the form A–D, i.e., the old stimulus A is paired
with a new stimulus D in the second list. Later, participants are
asked to recall either B or D or both in response to the cue word
A. The classic finding is that, with an increasing number of in-
terpolated learning trials (A–D), recall of B diminishes and recall
of D increases (e.g., Barnes and Underwood 1959). It is assumed
that both unlearning of A–B associations and response competi-
tion between B and D underlie this effect (e.g., Postman and
Underwood 1973).
Although the interference paradigm resembles our para-
digm at first sight, there are two major differences. First, learning
of A–D usually takes place right after learning of A–B, i.e., the
interference paradigm lacks the crucial reactivation component.
Therefore, even if one argues that A serves as a reminder of B, the
classic retroactive interference paradigm speaks to the issue of
memory consolidation (cf., Müller and Pilzecker 1900) and not to
reconsolidation. However, in studies with a time delay between
the presentation of A–B and learning of A–D, A could well serve
as a reminder of B and, in turn, reconsolidation processes
could play a role in the unlearning of B. Because interference as
well as misinformation studies do not usually include a no-
reactivation condition, it is impossible at this point to decide
what role reconsolidation processes might play in the develop-
ment of such effects. Second, we did not replicate classic inter-
ference effects. A comparison between the no-reminder and the
no-interference control in Experiment 1 shows that learning a
second list does not affect memory for the first list per se. Our
critical effect was dependent on the presence of a reminder.
While the reminder caused participants to incorporate List 2
items into List 1 recall, it did not significantly diminish recall of
List 1 items.
The misinformation paradigm is very similar to the retroac-
tive interference paradigm. In misinformation studies (e.g., Lof-
tus 1975; for a recent review, see Loftus 2005), participants are
presented with a complex event (e.g., a slide show depicting a car
accident). Then, half of the participants receive some misleading
information about the event (e.g., about the traffic sign that
marked the intersection), whereas the other half does not. When
participants are later asked to remember the event, the misled
participants often report the misinformation (e.g., a yield sign)
instead of the information that was part of the slide show (e.g., a
stop sign). Loftus (1975) assumed that the misleading informa-
tion alters the original memory trace (cf. unlearning in retroac-
tive interference). Alternatively, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985)
proposed that the original memory trace remains unaffected.
Rather, misinformation can be accepted for a variety of reasons.
For instance, participants might not have encoded the original
information sufficiently or might have difficulties remembering
it, and the misinformation simply fills in those gaps. Participants
might also confuse the source of misinformation as being from
the original event (cf. source-monitoring account; Johnson et al.
1993).
We hypothesize that reconsolidation is the mechanism that
mediates the misinformation effect. In the misinformation para-
digm, the misleading information is directly related to the origi-
nal event. For instance, the misleading information is often em-
bedded in questions about the original event (e.g., how fast was
the car that ran the yield sign). Thus, it is likely that the mislead-
ing information reactivates the original memory, making it open
to change. However, a condition in which the memory is not
reactivated is usually missing in the misinformation paradigm
(for an exception and a reduced false memory effect, see Lindsay
et al. 2004). Such a control condition would need to be incorpo-
rated in the misinformation paradigm to directly compare the
misinformation effect and reconsolidation.
Reconsolidation is an important mechanism for under-
standing plasticity, potentially explaining how organisms build
on prior experience while incorporating new information. Al-
though previous studies have mainly demonstrated disruptive
effects of reactivation, our study shows that reminders can also
trigger constructive processes, allowing for the incorporation of
new information into old memories. Our study also shows that
memory can be activated with a fairly subtle reminder. An inter-
esting question has to do with the cues triggering reactivation:
recall of the first session or reminding from experimental context
(the location of testing and/or the experimenter). We are cur-
rently exploring this issue.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated post-reminder effects
in episodic memory. More than a hundred years ago, Müller and
Pilzecker (1900) suggested a perseveration-consolidation process
to explain their observations that retroactive interference de-
creased with the amount of elapsed time between the presenta-
tion of the first and second list. We now show that a second list
can have memory-changing effects even at a later time point and
that this effect depends critically upon the reactivation of
memory for the original list. This finding suggests that memory
“traces” are dynamic rather than static, and that consolidation
does not irreversibly transform them into a permanent state.
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